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Inventions and Employment Abroad
CATHERINE TORNABENE*
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-i98os, Congress extended patent law to address concerns
that manufacturing and other commercial activities abroad circumvented
United States patent protection.' Traditionally, United States patent law
did not have extraterritorial effect.! But by the mid-i98os some worried
that would-be infringers evaded liability and exported American jobs by
performing patented processes and making patented apparatus abroad.3
This concern drove the passage of the Patent Law Amendments Act,
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007; M.S. (Computer
Science), Stanford University, 1998. I am grateful to Professor Jeffrey Lefstin for his helpful comments
and to my family for their patience and support.
i. See infra Part I.
2. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) ("The right
conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its Territories... and
infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country."); Brown v.
Duchesne, 6o U.S. 183, 195-96 (1856) (United States patent laws "do not, and were not intended to,
operate beyond the limits of the United States; and as the patentee's right of property and exclusive
use is derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which the law itself is confined. And
the use of it outside the jurisdiction of the United States is not an infringement of his rights, and he has
no claim to any compensation for the profit or advantage the party may derive from it."); see also
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, I Stat. to9, iii (repealed 1793) (providing that patents were only
infringed if the infringing act occurred "within these United States"). As one well-known patent law
scholar observed, "[o]f the three principal forms of intellectual property, patent rights are most
explicitly territorial." Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual
Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 605 (1997).
3. United States patents issue to the inventor of "any new and useful process, machine.,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.... " 35 U.S.C.
§ 10 (2000). Patents that recite machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter are known
collectively as product patents to distinguish them from process patents. i DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS § 1.02 (2006). In contrast, process patents, also known as method patents, cover "an
operation or series of steps leading to a useful result" rather than a structural entity. Id. § 1.03.
Inventions often feature both product and process claims. Id.
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which added 35 U.S.C § 271(f)4 and a few years later, the Process Patent
Amendments Act, which added 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).'
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
interpreted the breadth of these two statutes. The decisions are
somewhat contradictory. While § 271(f) has been interpreted broadly,
§ 271(g) has been interpreted narrowly, an odd legal quandary in which
companies are effectively rewarded by United States patent law for
moving production abroad.
Examining the export and import of information products such as
software demonstrates the unexpected effect of the Federal Circuit's
§§ 27 1(f) and (g) jurisprudence. The inconsistent jurisprudence also
affects traditional manufacturing products that are considered steps of a
patented process.6 If such products are components of a patented
invention, their export from the United States triggers infringement
liability under § 27 1(f). However, the same products coming into the
United States will not infringe under § 271(g), even if generated by a
United States process patent.
Part I of this Note examines the history and original goals of 35
U.S.C. §§ 271(f) and (g). Part II examines recent divergent
interpretations of both sections by the Federal Circuit. Part III discusses
the effect the decisions may have on industry in the United States. Part
IV examines suggested approaches to resolving the gap between the
§§ 271(f) and (g) jurisprudence and how those approaches might affect
the export of jobs from the United States.
I. THE HISTORY OF §§ 271(F) AND (G)
Both statutes were promoted as job-protection statutes and they
were passed within a few years of each other. A discussion of the history
of both statutes and their common goals follows.
A. THE PASSAGE OF § 271(F)
Section 271(f) passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.7 Laitram held two patents that
covered shrimp deveining devices.8 Deepsouth, which sought to avoid
patent infringement liability in the United States, shipped pieces of the
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
5. Id. § 271(g).
6. There is an ongoing dispute as to what it means to be a step of a patented process. See infra
notes O5-1 17 and accompanying text.
7. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
8. Id. at 519-20. The two patents at issue in Deepsouth were combination patents, "warranted




machines abroad where they were assembled in less than an hour.9 The
assembled machines infringed Laitram's patents, but Deepsouth
maintained that the manufacture and export of the unassembled
machines for final assembly abroad did not violate § 271 because both
the "making" and the "use" of the infringing machines occurred abroad.
The Supreme Court, after observing that "[s]hrimp, whether boiled,
broiled, barbecued or fried, are a gustatory delight, but they did not
evolve to satisfy man's palate,"" found no infringement.'2 The Court
refused to grant extraterritorial rights to United States patent law'3
without a "clear congressional indication of intent" to do so, effectively
issuing an invitation to Congress to address the issue.'4
Congress passed the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984' in direct
response to the Deepsouth decision. 6 The Congressional Record is not
extensive, at least as compared to the § 271(g) record, but it does provide
an indication of the goals of the legislation: to "avoid encouraging
manufacturing outside the United States[, § 27 1(f)] will prevent copiers
from avoiding U.S. patents by supplying components of a patented
product in this country so that the assembly of the components may be
9. Id. at 523-24.
10. Id. Laitram sought an injunction against Deepsouth under § 271 (a), id. at 527, which provided
that "whoever without authority makes, uses, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefore [directly] infringes the patent," id. at 522 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting § 271(a)).
II. Id. at 518-19.
12. Id. at 527 ("The statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented
product outside of the United States."). Laitram needed to show that Deepsouth "'made,' 'uses,' or
'sells' the patented product within the bounds of [the United States]" in order to establish § 271(a)
direct infringement for the purposes of injunctive relief. Id. The Fifth Circuit, in finding infringement,
had determined that "makes" meant the "substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of the
machine." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co.,
443 F.2d 928, 939 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court rejected that approach, observing that it had
frequently held that "a combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of the whole
and not the manufacture of its parts." Id. at 528. Therefore, there is no direct infringement of the
patent where the final "association" of the "separate elements" constituting the patented invention is
"outside the territory for which the monopoly was granted." Id. at 529 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (1935)).
13. Id. at 531 ("In conclusion we note that what is at stake here is the right of American
companies to compete with an American patent holder in foreign markets. Our patent system makes
no claim to extraterritorial effect: 'these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate
beyond the limits of the United States,' and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such
control over our markets." (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856))).
14. Id. at 532 (noting that the Court "would still insist on a clear congressional indication of intent
to extend the patent privilege before [it] could recognize the monopoly here claimed").
15. Pub. L. No. 98-622,98 Stat. 3383 (1984).
16. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS: PATENT LAW AMENDMENTS OF 1984, 130 CONG. REC. 28,065,
28,069, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828 ("This proposal responds to the United States
Supreme Court decision in [Deepsouth], concerning the need for a legislative solution to close a




The final version of § 271(f) as proposed by the Patent Law
Amendments Act contained two clauses." Both clauses addressed the
export of "components of a patented invention"'9 for combination
abroad "in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States."2 The clauses provided patentees two
separate grounds for alleging infringement that could be used together or
separately.2' Clause (i) was directed at those who supplied or caused to
be supplied "all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention ... in such manner as to actively induce the combination of
such components outside of the United States."22 Clause (2) was directed
against those who supplied "any component of a patented invention that
is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention...
knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that
such component will be combined outside of the United States."23
When signing the bill into law, President Reagan emphasized that a
strong patent system helped the United States stay at "the cutting edge
of technology." 4 He explicitly endorsed Congress's concern that
potential infringers would both export jobs and avoid United States
patent liability by shipping parts for final assembly abroad.
B. THE PASSAGE OF § 271(G)
Four years after the enactment of § 271(f), Congress passed the
Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988.26 Like § 271(f), § 271(g) passed
17. Id.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
19. The phrase "components of a patented invention" was not defined in the statute or in the
legislative history, though the legislative history indicated that the phrases "actively induce" and
"especially made or especially adapted for us in an infringement" in the new law were drawn directly
from other clauses of 35 U.S.C. § 271. See SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS, supra note 16 ("The term
,actively induce' is drawn from existing subsection 271(b) of the patent law, which provides that
whoever actively induces patent infringement is liable as an infringer... '[E]specially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use' comes from existing § 27I(c) of the patent
law.").
20. Id. § 271(f).
21. See, e.g., Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. Fred Ostermann GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812, 820 n.48
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd sub nom., BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., I F.3d 1214 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 27I(f)(I).
23. Id. § 27 r(f)(2).
24. Statement on Signing H.R. 6286 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 45, at 1818 (Nov. 9,
1984).
25. Id. ("[Section 271(f) ] closes a loophole in existing law which permitted copiers to export jobs
and avoid liability by arranging for final assembly of patent machines to occur offshore. The act
eliminates unwarranted technicalities in the patent law that threaten the validity of patent for
inventions arising from corporate research teams.").
26. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9003, 102 Stat. 1564 (1988).
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in response to concerns about loopholes in U.S. patent law detrimental
to American industry and jobs in the face of foreign competition," but
unlike § 271(f), the legislative history is extensive." Congress considered
several proposals for patent law reform before the Process Patent
Amendments Act was finally passed in 1988.29
When it was finally enacted, § 27i(g) was designed to complement
19 U.S.C. § 1337, which provided remedies from the International Trade
Commission against "unfair methods of competition."3 Section 271(g)
established infringement liability against "[w]hoever without authority
imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the




The new statute contained two important exceptions to the general
infringement liability it established: "A product which is made by a
patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be
so made after[] (i) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another
product.""
C. THE SHARED GOALS OF §§ 271(F) AND (G)
Though different in the infringement liability they established, both
§§ 271(f) and (g) shared the goal of protecting American jobs and
industry from foreign competition. The Federal Circuit noted that
"[t]ogether, the two new statutory acts of infringement were intended to
27. See, e.g., S. REP. 1OO-83, at 29 (1987) ("As compared with those of our major trading partners,
the inadequate protection contained in U.S. process patent law has emerged as a major factor in the
dynamics of global innovation and economic competition.").
28. See Glenn Law, Note, Liability Under the Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 for the Use
of a Patented Process Outside the United States, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 245, 251 n.27 (1991) (compiling
the legislative history of § 271(g)).
29. For example, in 1966 the President's Commission on the Patent System recommended
protecting imported products made by patented processes. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT
Sys., "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS," IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 35-36
(1966); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (a
discussion of the history of the Act); S. REP. No. 94-642, at 5-7 (1976) (summarizing proposed patent
law reform in the 9oth to 94th Congresses).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000). Methods of competition unfair to United States businesses included
importing articles "made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of" a United States
process patent. Id. § 1337(a)(I)(B)(ii). Congress observed in debating § 271(g) that an unfair method
of competition under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 was
the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or sale within the United
States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that.., are made,
produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered by the claims of a
valid and enforceable United States patent.
H.R. REP. No. ioo-6o, at 8-9 (1987).
31. 35 U.S.C, § 271(g) (2000).
32. ld. As with § 271(f), key phrases such as "component" or "materially changed" were not
solidly defined in the legislative history.
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'avoid encouraging manufacturing outside the United States."'33 The
legislative histories of both indicate an abiding concern with foreign
infringers who, according to Justice Blackmun in his Deepsouth dissent,
"reap the fruits of American economy-technology, labor, materials,
etc.-but [who are not] subject to the responsibilities of the American
patent laws.,
34
The idea of revisiting the concept of patent law territoriality was
discussed for some time before §§ 271(f) and (g) passed. The proposal to
protect against extraterritorial use of process patents, which eventually
became § 271(g), was first suggested in the 1966 Report of the President's
Commission on the Patent System as part of a general initiative to
improve American competitiveness.35 After the Deepsouth decision
triggered pressure for patent protection covering infringing inventions
manufactured abroad, reform that eventually became § 27 1(f) was also
proposed.36
In 1983, in one of a series of proposed patent law reform bills, the
two statutes were proposed and discussed together.37 The first part of that
proposed bill was a precursor to § 271(g) but was eventually dropped
from the final bill due to debate about the scope of the proposed
statute.? The second part, however, passed, and after some modifications
eventually became § 271(f).39
Both proposed statutes were promoted as domestic job protection
bills. One sponsor of a 1985 version of § 271(g) argued that "establishing
effective, international protection of intellectual property.., should be a
critical component of our trade policy [and a] critical component of our
efforts to maintain industrial competitiveness."'4 He described his bill as
"a jobs bill."'" The 1984 combined bill, which included versions of
§§ 27 1(f) and (g), was proposed "to avoid encouraging manufacturing
outside the United States. '42 After § 27 1(f) passed, the precursors to
33. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting 130 CONG. REC. 28,069 (1984)).
34. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 534 (1972) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc., 443 F.2d 936,939 (5th Cir. I7i)).
35. See PRESIDENr's COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYS., supra note 29, at 35-36.
36. See supra Part I.A.
37. Bayer AG, 340 F.3d at 1374.
38. Id. at 1374 n.xo (citing 130 CONG. REc. 31,834 (statement of Sen. Mathias)).
39. Id.
40. 131 CONG. REC. 21,738 (1985) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). Sen. Lautenberg quoted a
report of the International Trade Commission on American jobs lost due to infringement of
intellectual property. Id. at 21,739 ("The International Trade Commission estimated, back in 1982,
that infringement of U.S intellectual property cost Americans 13 1,000 jobs in just 5 selected industrial
sectors, and cost the Nation's businesses $5.5 billion in annual sales. Since then, it is widely believed,
the problem has gotten worse.").
41. Id.
42. 130 CONG. REC. 28,o69 (1984) (statement of Sen. Kastenmeier).
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§ 271(g) continued to be discussed in reference to jobs and industry
within the United States. The 1985 Report of the President's
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness, which concluded that "[t]he
United States is losing its ability to compete in world markets,"43
recommended protecting the imported products of process patents as a
means of protecting American competitiveness.'
II. DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE STATUTES
While the original goals of both statutes were similar, the Federal
Circuit's jurisprudence on each has yielded different results as to the
reach of each statute. Section 271(f) now supports broad extraterritorial
infringement liability but § 271 (g) is narrower in scope. The key cases in
this area are discussed in this Part.
The initial § 27 1(f) cases heard before the Federal Circuit appeared
to limit the reach of § 271(f) to manufactured products covered by
United States product patents. In one of the earliest § 271(f) cases,
Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, the Federal Circuit
suggested that § 271(f) did not apply to process patents, though it did not
provide any further analysis.45 A 20oi case established that § 27 1(f)(2)
did not require physical assembly of the infringing components into the
final patented invention, just that they be shipped abroad with that
intention. However, in 2004 the Federal Circuit emphasized the physical
nature of exported § 271(f) components in Pellegrini v. Analog Devices,
Inc.47 That case appeared to effectively restrict the applicability of
§ 270(f) to patents on machines or other physical devices."' Other lower
court decisions had also refused to extend § 271(f) to process patents,
believing that process patents lacked the "components of a patented
invention" necessary for infringing assembly abroad.49
43. i PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS. COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION THE NEW REALITY
II (1985).
44. 2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS. COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 43, at 317 (1985).
45. See 953 F.2d 136o, 1374 (Fed. Cir. i9i) ("[Wie do not find the provisions of [§ 271(f)]
implicated."). The patent at issue covered a process for producing asphalt, but not the apparatus for
implementing the process. Id. The alleged infringer had sold a machine which performed the process
to a foreign customer. Id. The machine was not sold to customers in the United States or used in the
United States, either of which would have triggered infringement liability under § 27 i(a).
46. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Waymark Corp. was
the exclusive licensee to a method and corresponding system for testing the capacity of batteries. Id. at
1365. Porta Systems shipped components of an infringing system to Mexico with the intention that
they be assembled there, but the final systems were never assembled. Id. The Federal Circuit found
possible liability under § 27 1(f)(2), noting that "[a]t no point does the statutory language require or
suggest that the infringer must actually combine or assemble the components. A party can intend that
a shipped component will ultimately be included in an assembled product even if the combination
never occurs." Id. at 1368. The patent at issue in that case was directed to an apparatus. Id.
47. 375 F.3 d 1113, 1117-18 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at i I8.
49. See Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported
November 2006]
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The initial Federal Circuit decisions on § 271(g) similarly limited the
extraterritorial reach of the statute. In 1996, the Federal Circuit
examined the two exceptions to § 271(g) in Eli Lilly & Co. v. American
Cyanamid Co.5" Eli Lilly owned a patent that recited a process for
making an intermediate drug compound used in the production of a
broad-spectrum antibiotic.5 The intermediate compound underwent four
subsequent steps before it was converted into the final antibiotic product,
which was not covered by the patent.52 Eli Lilly had sought a preliminary
injunction against the importation and sale of the generic antibiotic in
the United States, arguing that the drug infringed its patent on the
intermediate process and therefore triggered § 27(g) process patent
protection.53 Eli Lilly proposed that the Federal Circuit establish a
standard that a product of a patented process would not be considered
materially changed under § 271(g) if the "principal commercial use of
that product [lay] in its conversion into the product that [was] the subject
of the infringement charge."54 In other words, Eli Lilly proposed that
infringement under § 271(g) should look directly to the use of the
disputed product after it was imported into the American market.
The Federal Circuit rejected this reasoning, although the court was
sympathetic to the policy argument that reading the "materially
changed" language of § 271(g) too strictly would subvert Congress's
desire to protect American process patent holders in passing the statute.55
Judge Rader concurred with the result but disagreed with the analysis of
the "materially changed" language of § 271(g), suggesting that "[r]ather
than attempting to distill an elixir from this intoxicating witches brew of
enactment history, this court should interpret 'material change'
consistent with the overriding purpose of the Act-to provide protection
to process patent holders.""
The 2003 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. decision in the
Software: 35 U.S.C. § 27I(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 557, 570-73 (2004).
50. 82 F.3d I568 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 1570.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1571-72.
54. Id. at 1572.
55. Id. ("Although we are not prepared to embrace Lilly's argument, we acknowledge that it has
considerable appeal. Congress was concerned with the problem of overseas use of patented processes
followed by the importation of the products of those processes, and a grudging construction of the
statute could significantly limit the statute's effectiveness in addressing the problem Congress targeted.
That is especially true with respect to chemical products, as to which simple, routine reactions can
often produce dramatic changes in the products' structure and properties."). The court noted that the
legislative history was "not easy to interpret, in part because it purports to identify some products that
can be 'materially changed' without being 'materially changed."' Id. at 1575. The court expressed
concern that the effect of Eli Lilly's proposed reading of § 271(g) "would be sweeping. Absent clearer
congressional direction, we decline to adopt so broad a principle." Id. at 1576.
56. Id. at I581 (Rader, J., concurring).
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Federal Circuit is the most recent and most definitive statement as to the
breadth of § 271(g). 7 Housey owned method patents which disclosed
processes used to test substances ("agents") for their activating or
inhibiting effect on protein activity in cells. 8 Bayer used those patented
processes outside of the United States to characterize pharmacologically
active agents." The gathered information regarding the agents was then
sent back to the United States for use in making drugs in the United
States. 6' Bayer also imported "a pharmaceutical composition identified
by the patented process .... ,6' The disputed § 27i(g) issue was "the
meaning of the phrase 'a product which is made by a [patented]
process. ' ' ' 6' Housey contended that importing information obtained by
performing its patented process violated § 271(g) because the imported
information was "a product made by a patented process.
6
,
The Federal Circuit rejected this interpretation of the reach of
§ 27I(g).6' The court determined that the phrase "made by a patented
process" should be interpreted as "manufactured by a patented process"
because "Congress did not intend to expand coverage Iof infringement
liability under § 271(g)] beyond manufactured articles." Therefore the
statute "[ayplied] only to physical goods and that information is not
included." The court extensively analyzed the legislative history of
§ 271(g), and while it noted Congress's "concern over competition
between domestic and foreign manufacturers," it concluded that
Congress was focused primarily on the manufacturers of "tangible
products and not mere information."
67
While the Federal Circuit limited the protection of products made
by patented processes abroad under § 271(g), the 2005 Eolas
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. decision broadened the
extraterritorial reach of § 271(f).6' Under § 271(g), products produced by
patented processes abroad and imported into the United States infringed
only if those processes produced "tangible" goods that were not
materially changed. 6 However, after Eolas and the subsequent § 271(f)
cases, nearly any product or item, tangible or not, that is considered part
57. 340 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
58. Id.
59. Id.
6o. Id. at 1370.
6i. Id.
62. Id. at 1371.
63. Id. ("[T]he information . . . claimed in the Housey patents is itself a product made by a
patented process.").
64. Id. at 1377.
65. Id. at 1372, 1376 ("[T]he statute clearly contemplates that 'made' means 'manufactured.').
66. Id. at 1371.
67. Id. at 1376.
68. 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 200 5 ).
69. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
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of any patented invention, including process patent inventions, will
infringe if exported for combination abroad.
Eolas sued Microsoft for patent infringement in 1999.70 Eolas
claimed that elements of Microsoft's Internet Explorer web browser
infringed its patent,7 which the inventors asserted was the first instance
of interactive applications embedded in web pages.72
In the course of doing business abroad, Microsoft exported a small
number of "golden master disks" which contained the software code for
Windows.73 These master disks were sent to independent computer
manufacturers who replicated the code on the disks to computer hard
drives which were then incorporated into computers offered for sale
outside the United States.74 The original golden master disk containing
the Windows software code was never a physical part of an infringing
product, but Eolas sought royalty damages under § 271 (f). 75
At trial, a jury found infringement on the part of Microsoft and
awarded Eolas a royalty 6 that included foreign sales of the infringing
computer code under § 271(f).77 On appeal, the Federal Circuit, in a
panel opinion authored by Judge Rader, described the § 271(f) issue as
centering around whether software made in the United States and
exported abroad was a "component[] of a patented invention" for the
purposes of § 271 (f). 78
The court looked for the meaning of the phrase "components of a
patented invention" in the definitions section of Title 35 .79 The court
70. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1328.
71. The patent was entitled "distributed hypermedia method for automatically invoking external
application providing interaction and display of embedded objects within a hypermedia document."
Id. There were two claims at issue on appeal, a method and a product claim. Id. at 133o. The patentee
asserted that the product claim embodied the method claim. Id.
72. Id. at 1328-29. The preferred embodiment of the patent suggested one example of such
embedded interactive applications: "an image viewer that processes and displays 3 D images... and
allows the user to manipulate the images" in the browser window. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS t8886, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2000).
73. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331.
74. Id.
75. Id. In the trial court Eolas had sought royalty damages for both foreign and domestic sales of
the Windows operating system. Id. at 1331. In response, Microsoft moved in limine to prevent Eolas
from seeking damages based on foreign sales under § 271(f). Id. The district court denied Microsoft's
motion, finding that "source code is the legal equivalent of a piece of computer hardware and that 'in a
legal sense, a [sic] source code is made part of a computer product."' Id. at 1331-32. Therefore, "the
code on the golden master disks constitutes 'components' of an infringing product for combination
outside the United States under § 271(0." Id. at 1332. Microsoft had appealed the trial court's denial
of the in limine motion.
76. The royalty was $1.47 per unit of infringing product. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1338 (alteration in original).
79. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(f) (2000)); see also id. ("Title 35, in the definitions section,
defined 'invention' to mean 'invention or discovery'-again broad and inclusive terminology."
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noted that software code alone qualifies as a patentable invention."
Therefore, the code described in Eolas's patent fit under the "broad
statutory label of 'patented invention.' 8'
The court explicitly rejected Microsoft's argument that Pellegrin
imposed a "tangibility" requirement on § 271(f) components, effectively
limiting the reach of § 271(f) to physical, manufactured articles like the
shrimp deveining machines in Deepsouth.s3 The court noted that
Pellegrini did not address the meaning of the "components" language of
§ 27I(f)." Pellegrini "require[d] only that components are physically
supplied from the United States" and that decision did "not impose on
§ 27i(f) a tangibility requirement that does not appear anywhere in the
language of that section."5 Eolas therefore established that § 271(f)
liability extended to intangible components of patented inventions
exported for assembly abroad unlike its earlier finding limiting § 271(g)
liability to the tangible products of process patents in Bayer v. Housey.
Shortly after Eolas was decided, Microsoft again argued before a
Federal Circuit panel that exported software could not be considered a
component of a patented invention under § 271(f) in A T&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp. 6 The panel s7 however, regarded that issue as settled by
Eolas. The panel addressed the issue of how software components could
be supplied for the purposes of § 271(f), since it had already been
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 1o(a)); id. at 1338-39 ("Title 35, § IoI, explains that an invention includes 'any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter."' (quoting 35 U.S.C. § to)).
80. Id. (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 21o6(IV)(B)(i)(a) (8th ed., 2d rev. 2001)
("[35 U.S.C. § ioil ... explains that an invention includes 'any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter.' Without question, software code alone qualifies as an
invention eligible for patenting under these categories, at least as processes. The patented invention in
this case is such a software product. Thus, this software code claimed in conjunction with a physical
structure, such as a disk, fits within at least those two categories of subject matter within the broad
statutory label of 'patented invention."' (internal citations omitted)).
81. Id. at 1339.
82. See supra note 47-48 and accompanying text.
83. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1340.
84. Id. at 1341.
85. Id.
86. 414 F.3 d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
87. The case was heard by Judges Mayer, Lourie, and Rader, and the opinion was written by
Judge Lourie. Id. at 1367.
88. Id. at 1369. Microsoft had also argued that the software (as a series of machine instructions
itself) was analogous to the exported instructions in Pellegrini, but the panel distinguished Pellegrini.
Id. at 137o. The Windows software itself was a component under § 27 1(f); the Pellegrini analogy would
have instead been instructions sent by Microsoft to foreign software engineers to write code for
Windows. Id. ("[W]hat is being supplied abroad is an actual component, i.e., the Windows operating
system, that is ready for installation on a computer to form an infringing apparatus-not instructions




established that software could be a component for § 27 1(f). 89
AT&T alleged that Microsoft's Windows product infringed its
patent on speech "codecs," which are software programs that encode and
decode speech signals for compression and later decompression.' As in
the Eolas case, Microsoft sent a small number of master versions of
Windows abroad to manufacturers and authorized those manufacturers
to replicate the masters for installation on machines which were then
sold to foreign customers.9 ' The exported master disks allegedly
incorporated the infringing codecs.92
The legal issue on appeal93 was "whether software replicated abroad
from a master version exported from the United States-with the intent
that it be replicated-may be deemed 'supplied' from the United States
for the purposes of § 271(f)."' Microsoft had argued that a foreign-
replicated copy made from a master version from the United States did
not qualify for damages under § 271(f) because those foreign-replicated
copies of Windows were not "supplie[d] or cause[d] to be supplied in or
from the United States," but the court rejected this reasoning.95
The AT&T panel noted it would be "unsound to construe a statutory
provision that was originally enacted to encourage advances in
technology by closing a loophole, in a manner that allows the very
advances in technology thus encouraged to subvert that intent" 96 and
examined the "realities of software distribution."'  Foreign copying in
such an environment could be considered "supplying," as the goal was
not to focus on how the export of infringing components occurred, but
instead that they were exported. 8 While the panel discussed upholding
89. Id. at 1370.
9o . Id. at 1368.
9I . Id.
92. Id.
93. During the lower court trial, Microsoft moved in limine to exclude evidence of possible
liability under § 271(f). Id. ("In support of its motion, Microsoft argued that: (1) software is intangible
information such that it could not be a 'component' of a patented invention within the meaning of
§ 271(f); and (2) even if the Windows software were a 'component,' no actual 'components' had been
,supplied' from the United States as required by § 271(f) because the copies of Windows installed on
the foreign-assembled computers had all been made abroad."). The in limine motion was converted
into a motion for partial summary judgment of noninfringement under § 27 1(f), which the district
court denied. Id. The district court held that § 27i(f) did not limit "components" to tangible structures
and therefore software could be a "component" of a patented invention. Id. Furthermore, the district
court ruled that copies that were made abroad from a golden master disk were covered by § 271(0
given that the purpose of the statute was to prevent circumvention of infringement by exportation. Id.
The § 271(f) issue was expressly appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id.
94. Id. at 1369.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1371.
97. Id. at 1370.
98. Id. at 1370-71 ("[For software components, the act of copying is subsumed in the act of
,supplying,' such that sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes § 271(f)
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the legislative purpose of § 271(f), it dismissed Microsoft's contention
that expanding the reach of § 271(f) in this manner would damage the
domestic software industry':
Microsoft's impassioned recitation of a parade of horribles that may
befall the domestic software industry-such as the relocation of
manufacturing facilities overseas -provides an insufficient basis for
reaching a different result in this case. After all, the enactment of
§ 271(f) could have been similarly thought to result in the export of
jobs, and Congress still enacted that provision. Moreover, possible loss
of jobs in this country is not justification for misinterpreting a statute to
permit patent infringement."
The extent of patent infringement liability attaching to exported
components of patented inventions was broadened yet again when the
Federal Circuit found that every component of every form of invention is
covered by § 27 1(f)."'' In Eolas, the question had been whether software
could be a component, but in Union Carbide, the question was whether a
physical composition that represented one step of a process patent' °2
could be a component." Finding that § 27 1(f) applied to process
patents,' the Federal Circuit declined to address the controversy en
banc, over the objections of Judge Lourie.
Union Carbide's patent recited a more efficient process for
producing the gas ethylene oxide."'6 Ethylene oxide is a chemical
intermediate gas used primarily in the production of ethylene glycol."
Ethylene glycol has multiple forms, but it is most frequently (and
profitably) used as monoethylene glycol.' 8 Ethylene glycol, usually in the
form of monoethylene glycol, is subsequently used in the production of
polyester fiber, resins, antifreeze, aircraft de-icing fluid, and polyester
film."9
liability for those foreign-made copies.... Liability under § 271(f) does not depend on the medium
used for exportation .... Liability under § 271(f) is not premised on the mode of exportation, but
rather the fact of exportation.").
99. Id. at 1372.
loo. Id.
oll. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
102. See supra note 3 for a discussion of the difference between process patents and product
patents.
103. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1379.
104. Id. at 1378.
1O5. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 434 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (en banc).
io6. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1370. The patented process produced ethylene oxide with a
greater decrease in reaction temperature than prior processes. Id.
107. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., No. Civ. 9 9 -CV-274-SLR, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS I037O, at *2 (D. Del. June 9, 2004).
io8. Id.
tog. Id.; see also The Innovation Group, Chemical Profiles: Ethylene Glycol, http://www.the-
innovation-group.com/ChemProfiles/Ethylene%2oGlycol.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
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Prior art methods of producing ethylene oxide had used pure silver
catalysts,"' but Union Carbide's patent taught that silver catalysts which
included other alkali metals were more efficient."' Shell Oil exported
these (infringing) catalysts to its foreign affiliates for use in the
production of ethylene oxide abroad using the patented process."2
The original damages award did not account for Shell Oil's
exportation of the infringing catalysts because the district court had ruled
in limine that § 271(f) "is not directed to process claims.""..3 The Federal
Circuit panel reversed this holding."4 Judge Rader, writing for the panel,
observed that once again the breadth of §271(f) was up for
interpretation:
In other words, does [the phrase "components of a patented
invention"] apply to components used in the performance of patented
process/method inventions? [Eolas] recently answered this question in
the affirmative, holding that every component of every form of
invention deserves the protection of [§ 271(f)]; i.e., that "components"
and "patented inventions" under § 271(f) are not limited to physical
machines.'' 5
In finding that § 271(f) covers process claims, the panel endorsed the
approach of the Eolas court, writing, "[t]hus, as Eolas explained, the
statute makes no distinction between patentable method/process
inventions and other forms of patentable inventions."",,6 Judge Rader
found the facts of Eolas and the facts of Union Carbide complementary,
finding Microsoft's exported code analogous to Shell Oil's exported
catalyst.1
7
i1o. Catalysts are chemicals that increase the rates of chemical reactions without being consumed
or altered themselves. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., No. Civ. 9 9 -CV-
27 4 -SLR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1073
o
, at *2 (D. Del. June 9, 2004).
i i i. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1370. Union Carbide's improved process reduced the formation of
oxygen and water byproducts and also increased the efficiency of the chemical reaction. Id. The only
claim at issue on appeal concerned a process which involved a catalyst using silver, cesium and lithium.
Id.
I12. Id. at 138o.
113. Id. at 1378. The district court had prohibited Union Carbide from submitting evidence of
Shell Oil's sales abroad for the purposes of recovering damages under § 271(f)(2). Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1378-79.
i16. Id. at 1379.
117. Id. ("Moreover, Eolas and this case featured similar facts. In Eolas, Microsoft exported a
master computer disc with program code that caused a computer to perform various method steps....
Thus, both this case and Eolas feature the exportation of a component (i.e., a computer disc with
program code in Eolas and a catalyst in this case) used in the performance of a patented process or
method (i.e., the method steps executed by the computer in response to the computer readable
program code in Eolas and the commercial production of [ethylene oxide] in this case). In that setting,
Eolas applied § 271(f) to Microsoft's exported component. Similarly, §271(f) applies to Shell's
exportation of catalysts (i.e., a 'component') used in the commercial production of [ethylene oxide]
abroad (i.e., a 'patented invention').").
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III. DEFINING THE CURRENT EXTRATERRITORIAL
REACH OF U.S. PATENT LAW
The original protectionist goal of both statutes is implicated by these
somewhat contradictory lines of cases. Taken together, the Eolas,
A T& T, and Union Carbide decisions support broad liability under
§ 271(f) for exported products: any item, distributed in any form, that
could be considered a component of any patented invention, including
those inventions described by process patents, may trigger liability. This
not only expands extraterritorial reach of United States patent law,"8 it
offers an incentive to companies who think they may infringe an
American patent to move their entire production offshore. In contrast,
liability under § 271(g) has been rather strictly defined and as a result
the products of process patents practiced abroad may be imported into
the United States if those products fit into the § 27i(g) exceptions.
Traditional manufacturing products that are created by practicing United
States process patents abroad will still infringe under § 271(g). However,
the "materially changed" exception is available to importers, as in the Eli
Lilly case,"9 and § 271(g) as a whole is limited to what the Bayer court
described as "tangible" manufactured products.2
The wide gulf between liability that attaches to items leaving the
United States and those returning to the United States defies Congress's
purpose in enacting the statutes. While the original laws were intended to
retain jobs in the United States, under the current interpretations
potential infringers may escape liability by moving their entire
production abroad rather than keeping some production in the United
States, presuming the patent holder has no foreign patent protection. 
2
'
A. CHANGING UNION CARBIDE
Altering the facts of the Union Carbide case"'2 demonstrates the
tension between the Federal Circuit's §§ 27 1(f) and (g) jurisprudence and
the original protectionist goals of both statutes. Assume that Shell Oil,
118. See Dariush Keyhani, United States Patent Law and Extraterritorial Reach, 7 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 51, 51 (2005) (discussing growing extraterritorial reach of United States patent law).
i19. See supra notes 5o-56 and accompanying text.
I2O. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[Njothing in the
legislative history [suggests] that Congress was concerned that the preexisting statutory scheme failed
to reach intangible information ... . A 1987 Senate report on substantially identical legislation also
supports limiting the statute to manufactured tangible products .... [Tihere is no indication of any
intent to reach products other than tangible products produced by manufacturing processes.").
121. A failure to obtain foreign patents has traditionally been held against the American patent
holder. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 4o6 U.S. 518, 531 (1972); Pellegrini v.
Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d I 113, I 19 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The World Trade Organization maintains
minimum standards for protection of intellectual property, including patents, that must be supported
by all member states. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2003).
122. See supra notes 1O1-117 and accompanying text.
November 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
when it decided to enter the business of ethylene oxide production,
realized that exporting the catalysts used in the patented process would
trigger § 27 1(f) liability. In this alternate scenario, Shell Oil still wishes to
produce ethylene oxide using its patented method and sell it to foreign
affiliates even though exporting the catalysts infringes under § 27 (f).
Therefore, in an effort to avoid § 27 1(f) liability, Shell Oil moves its
entire production of ethylene oxide abroad.'23
Shell Oil produces ethylene oxide using the patented process in its
entirety at a foreign location which is, as in the original case, converted
into ethylene glycol and subsequently into various products.'24 Both the
ethylene glycol and the subsequent products are sold abroad and
imported back into the United States for sale. 2 '
The product of the original process goes through conversions similar
to the intermediate compound in Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid,
Inc. ,6 There is room for debate as to whether the conversion of ethylene
oxide into ethylene glycol would be considered material.'27 However,
even if there is debate as to whether the conversion from ethylene oxide
into ethylene glycol is a material change, the subsequent conversion of
ethylene glycol into assorted products such as antifreeze and polyester
fiber would almost certainly be material under the Eli Lilly standard. '
In order to avoid liability under the Federal Circuit's recent
interpretation of § 271(f), Shell Oil must export its entire production of
123. This example is not far-fetched. In the 199os, the United States was a net exporter of ethylene
glycol, but it is predicted that by 2010 it will be a net importer. See The Innovation Group, supra note
to9.
124. The ethylene glycol in this example, as in the Union Carbide case, would be converted into
resins, films, antifreeze, polyester fibers, and other products. See supra notes 107-IO9 and
accompanying text.
125. As established in the real Union Carbide case, ethylene oxide is a chemical intermediate
product. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. It must be converted into ethylene glycol to be of
any use, and the ethylene glycol is later converted to various products. Id.
126. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. In the Eli Lilly case, the chemical properties of the
intermediate compound and the final antibiotic in Eli Lilly "[were] completely different, the 'basic
utility' of the products [was] different, and the chemical structure of the two products [was]
significantly different. The changes between [the two compounds went] far beyond . . . minor
changes." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc., 82 F.3d 1568, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
127. As the structure of the chemical is changed, the conversion is probably material under Eli
Lilly. The Federal Circuit quoted a Senate Committee report indicating that not all chemical
conversions would be considered material: "Usually a change in the physical form of a product (e.g.,
the granules to powder, solid to liquid) or minor chemical conversion, (e.g., conversion to a salt, base,
acid, hydrate, ester, or addition or removal of a protection group) would not be a 'material' change."
Eli Lilly, 82 F.3d at 1577 (quoting S. REP. No. IOO-83, at 49 (1987)). Furthermore, like the unpatented
final product in Eli Lilly, id. at 1575, ethylene glycol can be made by methods other than using the
patented process, Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 5370
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing the methods used to make ethylene oxide before the claimed method was
developed).
128. Eli Lilly, 82 F.3d at 1577. The utility, chemical composition, and physical structure of the
resulting products are completely different than that of the original ethylene oxide.
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ethylene oxide abroad rather than keep some chemical manufacturing in
the United States as was done in the original case. Once production is
abroad, the company could issue instructions from the United States
governing the production of ethylene oxide using the patented process
without triggering infringement liability. '29 As a result of the Eli Lilly
decision, Shell Oil could then import the resulting ethylene glycol (and
certainly the converted final products) without fear of triggering § 271(g)
liability.
This imagined scenario demonstrates how the recent statutory
interpretation of §§ 27 1(f) and (g) is at odds with Congress's original
motivation behind both sections, keeping manufacturing in the United
States.3° Shell Oil would be effectively rewarded for moving its entire
production of ethylene oxide abroad. In the real case, it was penalized
for making the catalysts of the original process in the United States for
use abroad.
B. THE TANGIBLE PRODUCTS PROBLEM AND THE INFORMATION ECONOMY
Examining the type of product that has twice triggered § 270(f)
liability at the Federal Circuit for Microsoft-software and other
information products-demonstrates the distance between the original
protectionist goals of both statutes and the resulting jurisprudence. 3 ' The
Bayer court considered information "intangible" and therefore ineligible
for import protection under § 271(g). 3 ' On the other hand, the Eolas and
AT&T courts found liability for exported software, arguably another
form of information,'33 under § 271(f)."'34
Information, including software, is an easily exported and imported
commodity. The United States is a major exporter of software,
significantly more so now than when §§ 271(f) and (g) were enacted."35 It
does not require extensive shipping arrangements; as seen in both A T& T
and Eolas, valuable software can be shipped abroad on a single disk, the
129. See supra note 88.
130. See supra Part 1.
131. See supra notes 68-ioo and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
133. See Andrew F. Knight, Software, Components, and Bad Logic: Recent Interpretations of
Section 271(f), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 493, 493-94 (2005) (positing that software, as a set
of instructions to the machine, cannot be considered a component though it is information). The issue
of whether software is a component under § 271(f) is still very much disputed: Microsoft petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari specifically on the question of "[w]hether digital software code-an
intangible sequence of 'i's' and 'o's'-may be considered a 'component[] of a patented invention'
within the meaning of Section 271(f)() .... Petition for Writ of Certiorari, AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft
Corp., 126 S. Ct. I9O1 (2006) (No. 05-10 56).
134. See supra note 131.
135. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property- America's Overlooked Export, 20 DAYTON L.
REV. 809, 813 0995).
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golden master disk, or transmitted electronically.16 It can be transmitted
instantaneously, with very little expense.
Software development does not need to be tied to a single
geographic location. There are many major software companies
headquartered in the United States that do significant software
development abroad.'37 The software developed in locations such as
Ireland, India, and China is both sold abroad and imported back into the
United States.
31
The information economy is not limited to software, of course. One
analyst noted that businesses are increasingly interested in "knowledge
processing" abroad as they seek to reduce the cost of high-end services
that rely on the intellectual skills of educated employees.'39 By 2010,
knowledge-process outsourcing in India is expected to be a $17 billion
business, compared with about $5 billion in 2003.40 For example, analysts
and researchers in foreign countries now provide extensive stock
research and analysis for U.S. investment banks, hedge funds, and other
financial institutions. 4' Even traditionally local jobs such as teaching are
not entirely immune from competition abroad.'4 2
Recent Federal Circuit cases impact this complex and constantly
shifting economy. Under the § 27 1(f) line of decisions, software
companies exporting software that could be considered a component of a
patented invention (in AT&T this was a few lines of software out of
millions) could be liable for infringement regardless of the method of
distribution. However, sending instructions abroad to write infringing
software or perform patented processes would not infringe under
§ 271(f) as set forth in Pellegrini.43
One argument against the idea that broadly interpreting § 271(f)
encourages off-shoring of American jobs is that the U.S. market is too
big and valuable a market for manufacturers of software and other
136. See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Eolas Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
137. See Saritha Rai, Dell to Double India Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 20o6, at C6; see also
Eric Bellman, Microsoft to Invest $1.7 Billion, Add Jobs in India, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2005, at B9.
138. See McCarthy, supra note 135, at 815.
139. See John D. McKinnon & Peter Wonacott, Outsourcing Work Looms Large in U.S.-India
Ties-CEOs from Both Nations Urge Lower Trade Barriers; Fear of Political Backsliding, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 2006, at A 4 .
140. Id.
141. See Anjali Cordeiro, Indian Vendors Provide Research to Investment Banks in the U.S., WALL
ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006.
142. See Cris Prystay, Need Help with Calculus? Tutors Coach U.S. Students Online-From India,
WALL ST. J., July 5, 2005, at Ai1.
143. The Federal Circuit noted this point when rejecting Microsoft's argument that Pellegrini
should control in the AT&T case. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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information products to avoid entirely.'" Even though U.S. patent law
cannot affect foreign sales of infringing products made abroad,'45
infringing products made abroad which are sold or used in the United
States violate § 271(a). Under this reasoning, potential infringers would
not want to move production abroad, despite the potential freedom from
infringement under § 271(f), because they would still be selling
extensively in the U.S. market and thus infringing § 271(a). Furthermore,
the § 271(g) restrictions do not change the import of software much,
because software is generally not the product of a patented process so
much as a patented process itself.
The method of distribution of information products such as software
changes quickly, however, as the AT&T court observed.' 6 Software can
be distributed in the traditional manner, or it can reside on a server
outside the United States, as seen in the recent NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, Ltd. case.'47 The court in that case held that "a process cannot be
used 'within' the United States as required by section 271(a) unless each
of the steps is performed within this country.' ' .4 Under this holding, a
software distributor concerned with infringing a United States software
process patent could run part of the process on a server outside of the
United States. This removes the possibility of process patent
infringement under § 271 (a) in the United States.
IV. REFORM SUGGESTIONS
The gulf between the §§ 271(f) and (g) cases has not gone unnoticed.
Scholarly articles, judicial opinions, and briefs presented to both the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have made suggestions to
reconcile the two statutes. This Part examines those approaches and how
they might address the original protectionist goals of both statutes.
A. THE PHYSICAL COMPONENTS TEST
Some recent approaches to resolving the divide between the
§§ 271(f) and (g) cases have centered around what could be called a
"physical components" test for § 271(f) components.'49 Under this
I44. The United States Census Bureau reports that in 2002, the latest year for which figures are
available, software publishers as a whole had receipts of $103.7 billion. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF COM., SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS: 2002, at 1 (2004).
145. The Deepsouth court made this point when it noted that the respondent had foreign patents it
had not elected to use to pursue infringement. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S.
518. 531 (1972) ("Respondent holds foreign patents; it does not adequately explain why it does not
avail itself of them.").
146. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
147. See 418 F.3d 1282, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
148. Id. at 1318.
149. See, e.g., Steven C. Tietsworth, Comment, Exporting Software Components-Finding a Role




approach, exported components of patented inventions would be
considered "components" under § 271(f) only if they are analogous to
the manufactured parts of physical machines, not unlike the shrimp
deveining machine parts sent abroad in the original Deepsouth case.'
This approach, while allowing software to qualify for § 271(f) liability in
limited circumstances,'' would effectively exclude most, if not all,
process patents from protection.
Judge Lourie endorsed such an approach in his dissent to the
Federal Circuit's denial for a rehearing in Union Carbide.'52
Acknowledging that software can be a component of a patented process
under § 271(f), Judge Lourie suggested limiting § 271(f) components to
"include what traditionally would be physical components, but which, in
an electronic world, supplied electronically, are the equivalent of
physical components."'53 Under this reading, § 271(f) would not apply to
process patents at all, as "the whole tenor of [§ 271(f)] relates to physical
inventions, i.e., apparatus or compositions, not methods."'54 However, it
would apply to software, at least so long as that software could be
considered an equivalent to physical components."'
The major problem with the physical components test is that it is
difficult to apply outside of the context of litigation. If the standard is
"analogous to a physical component," how does a business executive
faced with a decision as to whether to perform work abroad or in the
United States decide what, precisely, is analogous to a physical
component? Does this test merely exclude steps of process patents
(effectively overruling Union Carbide) or does it exclude software as
well, on the grounds that software is not equivalent to a physical
component?
One commentator suggests that liability under § 271(f) should only
apply to software in compiled, machine-readable, executable format, not
the original, human-generated source code, effectively applying the
physical components approach to software. 6 The export of a compiled
program would trigger liability, but the export of source code would not.
Again, however, this is a difficult test for businesses to apply.
150. See supra note 9.
151. See Tietsworth, supra note 149, at 441-43.
152. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 434 F-3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir.




156. See Tietsworth, supra note 149, at 441-45. Computer programmers write software by first
writing source code in human-readable languages such as C, C++, or Java, which is then compiled into
machine-readable format, called executable format. See also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem.
Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3 d 823, 835 (ioth Cir. 1993) ("The computer program is written first in a programming
language, such as Pascal or Fortran, and then a binary language consisting of zeros and ones.").
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Furthermore, in many technologies the line between compiled
executable code and human-readable source code is not clearly
defined.' In fact, some may argue that the line between compiled code
and source code does not exist at all; the Federal Circuit observed in
Eolas that even something as fundamental as "software and hardware...
are practically interchangeable in the field of computer technology....
[S]oftware converts its functioning code into hardware and vice versa.'
'
,,
One must then ask what it means to export software that is analogous to
a physical component. Is software that is retrieved from a server in the
United States exported? The physical components test, as applied to
software as an example, is hard for businesses to apply. While the
operation of the common law may eventually bring clarity, the pace at
which the market operates far outstrips the pace of the judicial system.
The safer decision for a business fearing § 271(f) liability would be to
produce the software entirely abroad.
B. THE TANGIBILITY TEST
Other commentators and several amicus briefs filed in recent
Federal Circuit cases suggest a narrower variation of the physical
components test that would fully exclude software and other so-called
intangible components.'59 This approach would also exclude all process
patents from § 271(f) liability. Under this approach, § 2 7 1(f) would apply
only to the components of physical apparatus or systems, such as the
shrimp deveining machine from Deepsouth.'6°
An initial version of the proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005
included this stricter reading of § 271(f), requiring that components of
patented inventions be "tangible items" that "combine physically with
157. There are many commonly used scripting languages that are not compiled. Tietsworth, supra
note 149, provides the example of code burned into hardware, such as found on an EPROM, flash, or
programmable logic device.
158. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
159. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 133; see also Brief for Netscape Communications Corp. et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 6, Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1234) ("[T]he proper inquiry [in applying § 27(f)] is whether a
defendant manufactures domestically physical components of each specific infringing combination.");
Brief for Autodesk, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 4-5, Eolas, 399
F.3d 1325 (No. 04-1234) ("The term 'patented invention' in § 27 1(f) refers to physical embodiments
whose components, if any, are themselves physical."); Brief for Microsoft Corp. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 5, NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (No. 03-1615) ("[A] 'component of a patented invention' must be a physical product regardless
of whether the patent claims are directed to methods or products, and regardless of the technology at
issue."); Brief for Shell Oil Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant at io, Eolas,
399 F.3d 1325 (No. 04-1234) (petition for rehearing en banc) ("Congress associated 'components' with
only certain patented inventions, which it listed as 'machine, manufacture, combination, or
composition.' Without question, those are all physical structures or apparatus.").
I6o. See supra note 9.
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other components."' 6 ' This version would have effectively overturned the
Eolas decision, because the Eolas court had explicitly found that § 271(f)
did not impose a tangibility requirement on components of a patented
invention." However, this language did not make it into the introduced
version of the proposed bill.' 63
Proponents of the tangibility test cite the Congressional Record as
supporting the concept that § 271(f) does. not apply to intangible
components.'6 4 They also point to the fact that the Federal Circuit spent
considerable time in the Bayer decision picking through the
Congressional Record to determine that at the time Congress only
considered physical, tangible goods for the purposes of § 271(g), even
though the two statutes are entirely different in the liability they
establish.' 6' The Bayer court had concluded that "there is no indication of
any intent to reach products other than tangible products produced by
manufacturing processes" by the proponents of § 27I(g).' 66
While this is true of the excerpts of the Congressional Record that
the Bayer court examined, it is also true that the same Record does not
indicate an intent to exclude software or other intangible goods.i67 The
conclusion that Congress meant to exclude intangible goods from either
§271(f) or § 27(g) is premature. There is no explicit statement in the
Congressional Record that Congress meant to exclude intangible
information, just that Congress clearly meant to include products
produced by manufacturing processes. 6' In the mid-i 9g8os, it was not at
all clear that software could be patented as a process, thereby triggering
the protection of § 27I(g).' 69 Nor was it clear that software was even
patentable subject matter, which, under the reasoning of Eolas, is one of
the reasons that it can be considered a component under § 271(f).' 7° The
161. The proposed amendment would have added the following to § 271(f): "(3) An item supplied
in or from the United States is not a 'component' under this section unless the item is a tangible item
that is itself combined physically with other components to create the combination that is alleged to
infringe." PATENT AcT OF 2005, 109TH CONG. (Comm. Print 2005), available at http://
patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/DraftPatentStatuteDDC.pdf.
162. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1340 ("[Tjhe language of § 271(f) does not impose a requirement of
'tangibility' on any component of a patented invention.").
163. The Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, Io9th Cong. (2005), available at
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2oo5/o6/patentreform-p.html.
164. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 133.
165. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 34o F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 1375.
167. See supra note 16.
168. Id.
169. The 1998 State Street decision removed a fundamental limitation on patenting software by
determining that a software program was patentable. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin.
Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[So long as a process] produces a 'useful, concrete, and
tangible result' . . . [it is] statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed [only] in
numbers .... ).
170. See supra note 8o and accompanying text.
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first Federal Circuit case to permit the patenting of what could be
considered software was only decided in I994.'' That decision relied
heavily on the physical structure of the invention, which was tied to the
"intangible" software code at issue.'72 It was not until a i999 Federal
Circuit decision that it was clear that software could be patented without
reciting physical structure.'73
It is to be expected that Congress did not refer to intangible goods
when passing §§ 271(g) and (f); at the time of passage, it was not at all
clear that patents could cover amorphous inventions such as information
or software. Congress did not discuss intangible inventions because the
concept was not present at the time. Looking to the Congressional
Record to justify the exclusion of intangible products such as software is
therefore not a good argument.
As critics have noted, nowhere in the statutory language of § 271(f)
is there an exclusion of intangible items.74 The language of § 271(f) does
not restrict the statute to apparatus claims, a limitation that could have
been easily made at the time.
C. THE "PRIMARY INFRINGING USE" TEST
One recent suggestion for resolving the conflicts between §§ 271(f)
and (g) is to approach the issue of extraterritorial liability through
§ 271(a). 7 1 Under this approach, courts would resolve patent
infringement cases based on the economic impact on the United States
market, following the approach that the NTP v. Research in Motion
panel took 1, 6 and paralleling in some aspects the rejected approach
suggested by the plaintiff in Eli Lilly for assessing liability under
§ 271(g). 77 The pivotal factor for assessing infringement liability under
this approach is whether the primary use of the infringing product
occurred within the United States, thus violating § 27I(a). 78
Again, however, this is a difficult approach to take outside of the
context of litigation. For a company that does business in several
171. In re Allapat, 33 F.3 d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
172. Id. at 1544-45.
173. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
174. See Allen & Fisch, supra note 49, at 579-85; see also William R. Thornewell II, Note, Patent
Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of Technology: Application of 35 U.S. C. § 271(f) to
Software and "Virtual Components," 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815, 2836-39 (2005) ("[L]imiting § 27(f)'s
application to tangible components 'would be tantamount to legislating additional language to a
statute."').
175. See Elizabeth M. N. Morris, Comment, Territorial Impact Factors: An Argument for
Determining Patent Infringement Based Upon Impact on the United States Market, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 35 ,365 (2oo6)
176. Id. at 364-65 (analyzing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Inc., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
177. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
178. Morris, supra note 175.
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countries, it could be quite difficult to assess whether the primary
infringing use occurred within the United States. Faced with the risk of
liability under § 271(f), the safer decision for a multinational corporation
would simply be to produce the infringing product entirely abroad.
CONCLUSION
The A T& T court, as noted above, did not give much credence to the
idea that expanding the reach of § 271(f) would encourage the export of
jobs from the United States.' 79 Instead, like the Supreme Court in
Deepsouth, the Federal Circuit issued a clear invitation to Congress to
address the issue.' The decisions do encourage the export of jobs, but
the court is right in that the appropriate remedy is legislative.
Professor Donald Chisum, a well-known commentator, has
suggested repealing § 27 1(f) entirely as bad policy.' 8' He suggests that
§ 271(f) is "bad policy because it punishes those who produce
components domestically and exports them and rewards those who move
all production offshore.""" The divergence between §§ 271(g) and (f)
could be entirely removed by repealing § 271(f), which is both the less
defined and the broader of the two statutes.
Repealing § 271(f) entirely is the best approach. It saves business
executives from having to read Federal Circuit tea leaves as to what
would be considered a component. It clarifies questions as to what
triggers § 271(f) liability. Companies that move all production offshore
would not be rewarded with reduced liability as compared to those
companies that do some production in the United States and some
abroad. Repealing § 27 1(f) would encourage manufacturers to keep jobs
in the United States, especially jobs in industries such as software or
other information services that are easily exported.
179. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
18o. See supra note 14.
181. Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336,
347 (2005) [hereinafter Chisum, Reform]; Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in
Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 605 (1997) ("Assessed in terms
of economic policy, § 27 1(f) is ill-conceived. It was presumably an attempt to close a loophole created
by Deepsouth, but its most immediate effect is to create one more incentive for U.S. companies who
compete in foreign markets to move their manufacturing facilities abroad.").
182. Chisum, Reform, supra note I81, at 347.
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